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## SACER INTRA NOS SPIRITVS

BY CHARLES POMEROY PARKER

THE forty-first Epistle of Seneca, challenging comparison with Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians, is in some danger of being interpreted by our understanding of the Apostle's meaning. Setting aside all thought of modern or Christian ideas we ought to try to interpret Seneca from himself and from the Greek thinkers. It is possible that he may rather throw light on the New Testament writings than they on him; for he was a man familiar with the trend of Greek thought in his own time, and is pretty sure to show us how Greek words would have been understood by thoughtful men in Greek cities. That coloring sure to be given to important words by the readers of Paul's writings is a most influential modifier of the Hebrew thought in his epistles and we ought to look for it there. On the other hand, we can hardly suppose that any of his Hebrew thought was known to Seneca or likely to color a Latin epistle.

The text of the sentence to be discussed, as generally received, is given in Otto Hense's edition of 1898: *Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos*. The essential meaning of the word *spiritus* is the most important thing, but the construction of the sentence, and its context, must delay us for an instant. *Sacer* would seem to be the emphatic word, and one is tempted to make it a predicate adjective. For the context compares the soul of man to a grove of ancient trees, to a solemn cave in a mountain, to a wonderful river bursting from under ground. All these natural objects fill men with awe and suggest the presence of divinity: *fidem tibi numinis faciet . . . religionis suspicione percutiet . . . magnorum fluminum capita veneramur*. Like these is a man: *si hominem videris interritum periculis . . . non subibit te veneratio eius?* And it is not the man's body which causes this feeling. The body is referred to as *corpusculo*; but *animus excellentem . . . caelestis potentia agitatur*. *Non potest res tanta sine adminiculo numinis stare*. The soul is the holy consecrated place, like the grove, the cave, the river. And therefore one is tempted

to render the sentence thus, *The spirit that dwells in us is consecrated to God*; and then, omitting (with **p**, our best Ms.) the *et* before *custos* and understanding *est*, *its guardian is an observer of all our evil and good*. The *custos* is of course the Divinity who dwells in the soul. The interpretation thus given, as suggested by the context, would be a little easier if we could have the copula *est* instead of *sedet*; and two Mss. well spoken of by Fickert, one of the twelfth and one of the fourteenth century, read *spiritus est, sed et*. More important still is the fact that **p**, which, as we just said, is the best (Paris, n. 8540, an early tenth century Ms.), reads *s&&*,<sup>1</sup> and that Hense's **L** has *sed et*. Both these readings may easily have come from *set et* in some earlier Ms. or Mss., which would be a copyist's mistake for *est et*. After all then Seneca may have written *est* in the first half of the sentence and understood it in the other. But once let the mistake *set* be made, and let it be followed by *et*, a Christian familiar with his Latin Bible *Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis* (I Cor. 3, 16) might easily slip into the parallel *sedet* here; and *sedet* would find vogue thereafter because of the parallel.

If with either reading our interpretation of *spiritus* can hold as meaning the spirit of man, then we have a different metaphor from that in Epistle 31 (§ 11) where the human soul itself is called a god lodging (*hospitantem*) in a human body. There is no reason why Seneca should be held to the same metaphor in two distinct epistles. The whole context in Epistle 41 shows that the soul is the dwelling place, and that *spiritus* means the soul. Moreover, it is not common in Seneca to refer to God as *Spiritus*. He does use the words *caelesti spiritu* in the *Consolatio ad Helviam* (6, § 7), but nowhere else unless here does the essayist use this word in speaking of God. It would be strange then if besides doing so he should add the epithet *sacer*, and thus imitate the second Isaiah (63, 10 and 11), the Psalmist (51, 11, in the Hebrew Bible 51, 13), and the Apostle Paul (I Cor. 6, 19). The combination was a common Christian one of course and Seneca may have heard echoes of it in Rome. Or he may have boldly applied an epithet not uncommon with names of gods to this uncommon word for God and so by chance have paralleled Christianity. It seems less likely. But after all we may have been too urgent on the point. For the main purpose

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<sup>1</sup> Fickert attributed this reading to Par. b (Paris, n. 8539).

of our inquiry it is not necessary to be sure. In any case he believed that man's soul and God were the same in essence. The god who dwelt in the consecrated soul was necessarily himself of the nature of spirit. To the connotation of this word *spiritus* we must now give our attention.

Its meaning in Seneca is essentially a physical one. Its occurrence is most frequent, with him, in the *Naturales Quaestiones*, whose date is presumably not far from that of this epistle. One of the best places for studying the meaning of the word is the little treatise on air which occupies the first eleven chapters of the second book. In chapter 1 we find that *spiritus* is the cause of earthquakes :

Cum motus terrae spiritu fiant, spiritus autem aer sit agitatus, etiamsi subit terras non ibi spectandus est ; cogitetur in ea sede in qua illum natura disposuit.

In chapter 6 we find the word used of air in a state of tension, and to it are attributed many wonderful works. Seneca passes from the word *aer* to *spiritus* without the least sense of incongruity.

Intentionem aeris ostendent tibi inflata nec ad ictum cedentia. Ostendant pondera per magnum spatium ablata gestante vento. Ostendunt voces quae remissae claraeque sunt, prout aer se concitavit. Quid enim est vox nisi intentio aeris, ut audiatur, linguae formata percussu? quid cursus et motus omnis, nonne intenti spiritus opera sunt? Hic facit vim nervis, velocitatem currentibus.

In this passage Seneca distinctly adopts the Stoic theory of muscular action as defined by Cleanthes, who (as we read in Seneca, epistle 113, § 23), trying to define *quid sit ambulatio*, ait *spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum*. Pearson rightly remarks in his note on this passage (*Fragments of Cleanthes*, 43) that the Greek original of this would be πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι ποδῶν. The restoration of the word διατεῖνον is fully justified by the passage which Pearson quotes from Iamblichus, compared with the well-known fact that Cleanthes attached much importance to τόνος. Air in a state of tension extended from soul to muscles. Zeno accounted for voice<sup>1</sup> in the same way (see Pearson, *Fragments of Zeno*, 98), and Seneca

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<sup>1</sup> Similar would seem to be the account of perceptive energy given by the Stoics. See the quotation from Iamblichus, referred to above, in Pearson's note.

evidently has this in mind in the passage just quoted. To him *spiritus* shows itself as truly in muscular energy as in a strong wind; and this does not mean that the wind is what we should now call spiritual, but that muscular energy, *spiritus*, is material. And so he immediately returns to the whirlwind, showing its power in the forest, the city, and the sea; and then comes to tension of breath (*intentione spiritus*) as used in singing, and tension of air in musical instruments. His next illustration of *spiritus* is the life-energy in the seed of a plant:

Parvula admodum semina et quorum exilitas in commissura lapidum locum invenit, in tantum convalescunt ut ingentia saxa deturbent et monumenta dissolvant. Scopulos interim rupesque radices minutissimae ac tenuissimae findunt: hoc quid est aliud quam intentio spiritus sine qua nihil validum est?

The life-energy then of a plant, its soul, to speak in Aristotelian phrase, is *spiritus*. The same thing is true not only of a vegetative soul, but of an animal and a rational soul. For Seneca says almost immediately in the same chapter, while still speaking of *spiritus*:

Corpora nostra inter se cohaerent. Quid (enim) est aliud quod teneret illa quam spiritus? Quid est aliud quo animus noster agitur? Quis est illi motus nisi intentio? Quae intentio nisi ex unitate? Quae unitas nisi haec esset in aere?

Compare *Nat. Quaest.* 2, 10, § 3:

Illo spiritu, qui omnibus animalibus arbustisque ac satis calidus est; nihil enim viveret sine calore.

Now we cannot maintain that while this theory of the human soul was stated in the *Naturales Quaestiones*, because of the physical tone of those inquiries, nevertheless the *Epistles* reject the physical view of the soul. There are indeed traces of Platonic and Pythagorean influence on Seneca, but they do not change his use of the word *spiritus*, nor prevent his using it of the soul, while retaining its material meaning. Consider, for instance, epistle 50, § 6. He is there trying to urge the possibility of moral reform; he does not despair of reforming even hardened natures:

Nihil est quod non expugnet pertinax opera et intenta ac diligens cura. Robora in rectum quamvis flexa revocabis; curvatas trabes calor explicat, et aliter natae in id finguntur quod usus noster exigit; quanto facilius animus accipit formam, flexibilis et omni umore obsequentior.

Quid enim est aliud animus quam quodam modo se habens spiritus? [that is of course πνεῦμά πως ἔχον] Vides autem tanto spiritum esse faciliorem omni alia materia, quanto tenuior est.

This argument is not from the material to the spiritual (in the modern sense), but from one material thing to another. The material nature of *spiritus* is taken for granted, and *spiritus* is obviously the substance of the soul. In epistle 90, § 31, *spiritu* is used literally of the breath of a glass blower.

It is true that the word is rare in the epistles; and this rarity is due to the ethical tone of the work. The very rarity of the word in an ethical work suggests that its meaning is still physical. And when Seneca suddenly introduces it in epistle 41 he must have a physical meaning in it; there has been no adaptation of the word to metaphorical meanings. Over and over again in the *Naturales Quaestiones* it means agitated air; in epistle 50 it has the same meaning. There must be some reason why Seneca values the physical word here, and therefore uses *spiritus* instead of *animus*, or rather, parallel with *animus*.

The first reason lies in the thought of energy connected with the word. Force and power are essential thoughts of this epistle. *Spiritus* strikes the keynote; then in § 5 we have:

*Vis istuc divina descendit. Animum excellentem, moderatum, omnia tamquam minora transeuntem, quicquid timemus optamusque ridentem, caelestis potentia agitat.*

In this passage the energetic human soul is connected with divine energy. The same *motif* is felt in the comparison with the free lion in § 6. The meaning of energy in *spiritus* was illustrated above in the analysis of *Nat. Quaest.* 2, 6; but we may insist more strongly on the point. Muscular energy and life-energy were there called *spiritus*; generally we may say that when Seneca wishes to find a cause for any remarkable effect he is likely to fall back on *spiritus*. Observe *Nat. Quaest.* 2, 9, § 2:

Aqua autem quemadmodum sine spiritu posset intendi? Numquid dubitas quin sparsio illa quae ex fundamentis mediae arenae crescens in summum usque amphitheatrum pervenit cum intentione aquae fiat? Atqui nec manus nec ullum aliud tormentum aquam potest mittere aut agere quam spiritus. Huic se commodat, hoc ad tollitur inserto et cogente, contra naturam suam multa conatur et adscendit, nata defluere.

The Stoic was not able to form the concept of pure force moving matter; so he imagined air in tension filling the water and carrying it up. Again, just afterwards, when accounting for the buoyant power of water, instead of mere force he puts *spiritus* into it. We must remember that he is writing a treatise on air. He means not pure spirit, as in modern speech, but air in tension pervading water:

Quid? navigia sarcina depressa parum ostendunt non aquam sibi resistere quo minus mergantur sed spiritum? Aqua enim cederet nec posset pondera sustinere nisi ipsa sustineretur.

The same thing is noteworthy when he discusses thunder and lightning later in book 2. The well-known Stoic idea of air changing into fire is brought out (2, 14). Air by moving itself kindles itself, *Ipse enim se movendo accendit* (2, 15). Therefore *spiritus*, which means air in motion, and which is felt in thunder storms and seen to move the clouds, is invoked over and over again in explaining lightning and thunder. Earlier philosophers are called as experts. Aristotle uses the idea of πνεῦμα in his explanation (2, 12); so does Anaximenes (2, 17), so Anaximander (2, 18), so Diogenes of Apollonia (2, 20). Then when Seneca comes to his own theory he does not forget this lesson of his teachers, but *spiritus* figures largely in his explanation of the thunder clap (2, 27). And when, by the way, he has occasion to mention volcanic eruptions we find *spiritus* active in the volcano (2, 26, § 5). Indeed, Seneca seems to attribute to *spiritus* all the activities of steam so far as he half guesses them; for the ancients could not tell the difference between air and vapor of water. Then as to earthquakes, various theories of philosophers are given. Πνεῦμα is the cause according to Archelaus (6, 12), Aristotle and Theophrastus (6, 13), and others; Democritus (6, 20) mentions it among the causes; Epicurus (6, 20) says no cause is greater; and then Seneca adds (6, 21):

Nobis quoque placet hunc spiritum esse qui possit tanta conari, quo nihil est in rerum natura potentius, nihil acrius, sine quo nec illa quidem quae vehementissima sunt valent. Ignem spiritus concitat. Aquae si ventum detrahas inertes sunt; tunc demum impetum sumunt cum illas agit flatus. Et potest dissipare magna spatia terrarum, et novos montes subiectus extollere, et insulas non ante visas in medio mari ponere. Theren et Therasiam et hanc nostrae aetatis insulam, spectantibus nobis in Aegaeo mari natam, quis dubitet quin in lucem spiritus vexerit?

No passage could show more strongly the idea of energy associated with *spiritus*; and this association made the word useful for the purpose which Seneca had in epistle 41.

Another quality of *spiritus* was that of moving itself and giving itself tension and energy without any external cause. See *Nat. Quaest.* 2, 8 :

Nihil nisi intentione vehementius est, tam mehercule quam nihil intendi ab alio poterit, nisi aliquid per semet fuerit intentum. Dicimus enim eodem modo non posse quicquam ab alio moveri, nisi aliquid fuerit mobile ex semet. Quid autem est quod magis credatur ex se ipso habere intentionem quam spiritus? Hunc intendi quis negabit cum viderit iactari terram cum montibus, tecta murosque, magnas cum populis urbes, cum totis maria litoribus?

This quality of self-caused energy falls in excellently with the lesson which in epistle 41 as elsewhere Seneca preaches, — namely self-reliance. See 41, § 6: *Quis est ergo hic animus? qui nullo bono nisi suo nitet.* This association of the word *spiritus* is helped by the well-known meaning of spirited courage in the word, e. g. Epistle 94, § 46, *magnos animus spiritus concipit ac fiducia impletur*.<sup>1</sup> This note is struck in our epistle by the description of the free lion as *integri spiritus* (41, § 6). But the main idea is of energy whether in lion or man, or even, we may venture to say, in God.

For although the consecrated spirit of man is the theme of the letter, it is sacred because it has the presence and support of divinity, *Non potest res tanta sine adminiculo numinis stare*; and again, speaking of the man's body, *Vis istuc divina descendit*. But in pointing out this we are not returning to the old theory that *sacer spiritus* is the Holy Spirit in a man's body. The whole point of this epistle is that we begin by looking at a good human soul, and then find that there is something more than human in the soul. But the soul's connection with that divine power is of the closest; it is not merely visited at times by a divine influence, or a divine person; it is a part of the divine power. In one sense its real self is divine (41, § 5), *Maiore sui parte illic est unde descendit. Quem ad modum radii solis contingunt quidem terram, sed ibi sunt unde mittuntur, sic animus magnus ac sacer et in hoc demissus ut propius quidem divina nossemus, conversatur quidem nobiscum,*

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<sup>1</sup> Compare *De Ira*, 1, 20, § 5; 2, 21, § 3; 3, 3, § 5.



*sed haeret origini suae: illinc pendet, illuc spectat ac nititur, nostris tamquam melior interest.* So we get the mystic membership with God asserted. But it is not asserted here under the figure of membership, but under the figure of light, and the thought which colors this epistle is the 'consecrating presence of God in his temple, the human spirit, not membership with God as in epistle 92.<sup>1</sup>

But though God is not called a Spirit in this epistle of ours, yet as being the force and power which has come into and moves the soul, which is indeed the full reality of the soul, God might have been called Spirit. To call him so would have been for Seneca much the same thing as for a modern preacher to describe God as divine Energy, or Force. Only we do need to remember that on Seneca's lips the word *spiritus* would have carried with it the idea also of material substance, of fiery air. The early Stoics with the materialistic basis of their philosophy seem to have been willing to use the word πνεῦμα of God. For a useful collection of remarks and references on this subject see Pearson, *Fragments of Cleanthes*, 13. Moreover, Seneca himself in an earlier work, *ad Helviam matrem*, 6, § 7, has used the words *caelesti spiritu*. To account for the restless activity of man's mind he says:

Quod non miraberis si primam eius originem adspexeris; non est ex terreno et gravi concreta corpore; ex illo caelesti spiritu descendit.

And then, as he goes on, we learn what really *caelestium natura* is; and we find that he is talking about the heavenly bodies, especially the sun and moon (*sidera mundum inlustrantia*). We read of their perpetual stir and change, and finally, in § 8, he cries:

I nunc et humanum animum ex isdem quibus divina constant seminibus compositum moleste ferre transitum ac migrationem puta, cum dei natura adsidua et citatissima commutatione vel delectet se vel conservet.

Evidently God's nature is here that of the fiery stars, and it is called *spiritu* because of the intense energy of its agitation. As we saw above, the moving air, which is *spiritus*, easily kindled into fire. In this passage of the *ad Helviam* is excellently illustrated the idea of energy in *spiritus* which made it a good word for a forceful human soul in epistle 41, and

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<sup>1</sup> Ep. 92, § 30: Quid est autem cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid existere, qui dei pars est? Totum hoc quo continemur et unum est et deus; et socii sumus eius et membra. Capax est noster animus, perfertur illo, si vitia non depriment.

the material idea (though of very light and heavenly matter) which might make Seneca very sparing in the use of such a word either for God or the soul. For in his time there had evidently begun a movement of thought which was carrying Stoic minded thinkers away from material philosophy. We see this movement, for instance, in Philo, whose use of the word *πνεῦμα* is very interesting.

Platonic tendencies would have carried Philo solely to thoughts of God as *νοῦς* and *λόγος*, and so on. But he was conscious of the usual meaning of *πνεῦμα*, and he was forced to deal with the word as being the translation of *ruach* which occurs so often in the Hebrew Scriptures. For instance, commenting on Genesis 2, 7 (*ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνεῦμα ζωῆς καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν*), he remarks *πνευμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχῆς οὐσία* (I, 276, 24).<sup>1</sup> This is good Stoic doctrine in its form, but presently we find that he allegorizes *πνεῦμα* in contrast with blood (I, 277, 5-10):

ἡ μὲν οὖν κοινὴ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα δύναμις οὐσίαν ἔλαχεν αἷμα, ἡ δὲ ἐκ τῆς λογικῆς ἀπορρύνεισα πηγῆς τὸ πνεῦμα, οὐκ ἄερα κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ τύπον τινὰ καὶ χαρακτηρὰ θείας δυνάμεως, ἣν ὀνόματι κυρίῳ Μωυσῆς εἰκόνα καλεῖ, δηλῶν ὅτι ἀρχέτυπον μὲν φύσεως λογικῆς ὁ θεὸς ἐστι, μίμημα δὲ καὶ ἀπεικόνισμα ἄνθρωπος, οὐ τὸ διφνὲς ζῶον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον εἶδος, ὃ νοῦς καὶ λόγος κέκληται.

Philo, in this passage, still keeps to the consciousness that *πνεῦμα* implies power, but takes away from it in Genesis 2, 7 all physical meaning, and teaches that it is the power coming from divine Thought to man, and making him an image of divine Reason. This passage stands in complete contrast with that just quoted from the *ad Helviam*. For Thought and Reason with Philo are immaterial. A similar allegory is found in his comment on Genesis 6, 3 (*οὐ καταμενεί τὸ πνεῦμα μου ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς σάρκας*); he says, II, 46, 7-12:

λέγεται δὲ θεοῦ πνεῦμα καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ὁ ῥέων ἀπὸ γῆς τρίτον στοιχεῖον ἐποχούμενον ὕδατι . . . καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον ἡ ἀκήρατος ἐπιστήμη ἣς πᾶς ὁ σοφὸς εἰκότως μετέχει.

To prove the last proposition he quotes Exodus 31, 2-3. And so here, too, *πνεῦμα* is allegorized into intellectual life and divine knowl-

<sup>1</sup> The references are to volumes, pages, and lines of Cohn and Wendland's edition.

edge. But we find that it is not permanent in man, πνεῦμα θεῖον μένειν μὲν δυνατόν ἐν ψυχῇ διαμένειν δὲ ἀδύνατον κ.τ.λ. (II, 47, 13-14). The principal reason for the impossibility of a permanent abiding is the flesh.<sup>1</sup> The whole point of view is a complete contrast to Seneca's epistle 41. In Seneca man's spirit, which is energetic, fiery air, is the abiding place of divine Power. In Philo, man's soul, on account of the flesh, cannot be the permanent abiding place of divine Thought. The same idea is found in another form in another passage of Philo, I, 47, 4-7 :

ὁ γὰρ ἐνεφύσησεν οὐδὲν ἦν ἕτερον ἢ πνεῦμα θεῖον ἀπὸ τῆς μακαρίας καὶ εὐδαίμονος φύσεως ἐκείνης ἀποικίαν τὴν ἐνθάδε στειλάμενον ἐπ' ὥφελεία τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν, ἵν' εἰ καὶ θνητόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ὁρατὴν μερίδα, κατὰ γοῦν τὴν ἀόρατον ἀθανατίζεται.

Here God's Spirit is given to man, and like a Platonic idea conveys to him its own immortality. The philosophy is Platonic not Stoic, and the human spirit is not a member of God, but the divine spirit comes to make a divine colony in man's soul. The passage is not so unlike epistle 41, but there is no especial thought of energy or self-reliance in the soul, and the word spirit is used of God's activity rather than of man's.

Once more, there is an interesting pair of thoughts, beginning in I, 9, 10-12, προνομίας δὲ τό τε πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ φῶς ἡξιοῦτο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὠνόμασε θεοῦ, διότι ζωτικώτατον τὸ πνεῦμα, ζωῆς δὲ θεὸς αἴτιος κ.τ.λ. Philo is fully conscious of the connection of πνεῦμα with life, but any one who reads the full passage sees at once that he is much more interested in light. The fact is, perhaps, that Plato's influence on Philo draws him away from interest in physical energy, or any kind of energy, to calm intellectual contemplation.

What the full working out of this tendency became when a Platonized Stoic had no Hebrew Scriptures to remind him of a divine spirit we see in Marcus Aurelius. He has dismissed the whole concept of πνεῦμα as physical energy from his philosophy. The word has gone back with him to its meaning of breath. He classes it with flesh rather than with Thought; e. g. in 2, 2, when analyzing himself into his parts, he says :

<sup>1</sup> The whole passage about the incompatibility of flesh and spirit is worth study (47, 18,—50, 5). The spirit here is evidently identical with νοῦς.

ὁ τί ποτε τοῦτο εἰμι, σαρκία ἐστὶ καὶ πνεύματιον καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. He no longer makes the πνεῦμα the sacred temple of the divine power, but with a contemptuous diminutive separates it wholly from the controlling part of him. This is seen very clearly in the same paragraph further down: θέασαι δὲ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ὁποῖον τί ἐστίν· ἄνεμος· οὐδὲ αἰὲν τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ πάσης ὥρας ἐξεμούμενον καὶ πάλιν ῥοφούμενον. Again in 4, 3 we read: οὐκ ἐπιμίγνεται λείως ἢ τραχέως κινουμένῳ πνεύματι ἢ διάνοια, ἐπειδὴν ἅπαξ ἑαυτὴν ἀπολάβῃ καὶ γνωρίσῃ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐξουσίαν. In 12, 3, he analyzes himself again: τρία ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκας, σωματίον πνευμάτιον νοῦς. Comparing this with the analysis quoted above from 2, 2, we see that Thought, not Spirit, was to him the ruling element. Thought is also the only permanent thing, as in 12, 14: καὶν παραφέρῃ σε ὁ κλύδων παραφέρέτω τὸ σαρκίδιον, τὸ πνευμάτιον, τὰλλα· τὸν γὰρ νοῦν οὐ παροίσει. In 5, 27, the connection of man with God is touched on: συζῆν θεοῖς· συζῆ δὲ θεοῖς ὁ συνεχῶς δεικνὺς αὐτοῖς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν ἀρεσκομένην μὲν τοῖς ἀπονεμομένοις, ποιούσαν δὲ ὅσα βούλεται ὁ δαίμων ὃν ἐκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ· οὗτος δὲ ἐστίν ὁ ἐκάστον νοῦς καὶ λόγος. In this passage νοῦς or Thought occupies exactly the relation to God which *spiritus* occupies in Seneca's epistle 41. To Marcus Aurelius not energy, but calm thought is the highest state of man. To him Thought rather than Energy is divine.

And even a century before him Seneca is touched with something of the same tendency; he cannot easily in his ethical writings make frequent use of a word so physical as *Spiritus*. In strange contrast to the solitariness of this epistle is the overflowing use of πνεῦμα in the epistles of Paul.

The idea of energy and power which Seneca emphasized now and then was to Paul the very essence of his message. He had no desire to allegorize πνεῦμα into νοῦς as Philo did; for his ruling purpose was life rather than wisdom. Take for instance those passages of the first Epistle to the Corinthians which at first sight have such a resemblance to Seneca. First there is the sentence in 3, 16: οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι ναὸς θεοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν οἰκεῖ; The mention of God's spirit comes as naturally here as in Philo, and for the same reason; it is taught both to Paul and to Philo by their Hebrew Scriptures. But this very passage of Paul's epistle proves how different is his attitude to

wisdom. See in the almost immediate context, 3, 18, εἴ τις δοκεῖ σοφὸς εἶναι ἐν ὑμῖν ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ μωρὸς γενέσθω, ἵνα γένηται σοφός, ἣ γὰρ σοφία τοῦ κόσμου τούτου μωρία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἐστίν. And if this is, as it seems to be, a warning against wisdom brought by Apollos from Alexandria, the contrast is all the more striking. Then again the emphasis is laid on the presence of God's Spirit rather than on the excellence of the soul of man. The other passage is 6, 19. ἣ οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ὑμῶν ναὸς τοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐστίν, οὗ ἔχετε ἀπὸ θεοῦ; The Spirit here is the same spirit as in 3, 16, namely, τοῦ θεοῦ, and the use of this adjective ἁγίου in connection with πνεύματος is perfectly natural to a man of Isaiah's nation.

The energy of God's holy spirit is set forth in sharp contrast to the sins of the flesh; but it is as energy that the Spirit is opposed to the enslaving flesh, not as abstract Platonic thought (νοῦς), or as modern mystical personality. Such ideas were not naturally contained in the word πνεῦμα in the first century, nor were they naturally in the Hebrew writings unless a Platonist interpreted them. But the meaning of energy in πνεῦμα fits in admirably with the meaning of the Hebrew *ruach*, which is not mere Thought, or Personality in its depths, but life and power. The saying of Jesus, for instance (John 4, 24), of which our discussion naturally reminds us, when given in its Greek translation, πνεῦμα ὁ θεός, must have much the same meaning that any unPlatonized Hebrew would have given it in any dialect. In meeting the narrow thought which limits God's presence to Jerusalem or Samaria, Jesus spoke words which in those days meant not that God is above matter, time, and space, but that he is an Energy pervading the world, and that those who worship must do so with the energetic soul and with reality, because he is the real omnipresent Energy. In this way elsewhere we should do well to use the ascertained meaning of Spirit in the first century to interpret those Christian writings which appealed so strongly to many thoughtful Greeks at that time.